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INTRODUCTION
Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme Court apologetically applied strict scrutiny for the first time to an affirmative action program,
assuring us that this new turn would not be “strict in theory, but fatal
1
in fact.” As it turns out, the Supreme Court has been true to its
word. Eighteen years after pronouncing non-fatal strict scrutiny as
the standard governing all affirmative action programs, the Court re2
affirmed the standard in Fisher v. Texas —once again apologetically.
But this time the Court assured that the standard is not “strict in the3
ory but feeble in fact.”
Prior to applying strict scrutiny, the Court’s affirmative action ju4
risprudence remained undeveloped and at best unclear. The Court
intentionally marginalized its own opinion, instead relying on the
other, more competent branches of government to determine the ex5
istence and extent of affirmative action programs. In the Court’s
words, its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, “alter[ed] the
∗
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
Id. at 2421 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
See infra Part II.A.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (upholding a federal minority set-aside
statute, the Court stated that “courts must be satisfied that the legislative objective and
projected administration give reasonable assurance that the program will function within
constitutional limitations”).
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playing field” 6 for assessing the vitality of affirmative action programs
by, for the first time in its developing affirmative action jurisprudence, analyzing a congressionally approved affirmative action program through the lens of strict scrutiny while simultaneously declin7
ing to uphold the plan. However, the Court also declined to strike it
down. Instead, the decision left the question of the constitutionality
of the affirmative action program untouched, punting the question
8
down to the lower courts for resolution. The next year Neal Devins
predicted that the Court’s ambiguous holding would not be satisfac9
torily settled by the courts, but by elected political actors. Subsequent events have proven Devins’s prescience: declining to uphold
turned out to be a far cry from striking down.
A brief look away from Adarand to the Court’s most recent decision in Fisher demonstrates the Court’s continuing ambiguity as well
as the viability of Devins’s prediction. Fisher involved a challenge to
10
the race-conscious admissions procedures at the University of Texas.
Rather than ruling on the merits of the affirmative action program,
the Court applied the exact same methodology of Adarand: articulating the strict scrutiny standard and remanding to the lower courts to
11
determine the constitutionality of the program. In the meantime,
the seven-to-one decision left the program untouched and intact (Jus12
tice Elena Kagan recused herself from considering the case). The
13
decision has left many doubting affirmative action’s future.
6
7

8
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
Id. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s decision not to uphold the
federal affirmative action program departs from all previous federal affirmative action
cases).
Id. at 238–39 (“The question whether any of the ways in which the Government uses [affirmative action programs] can survive strict scrutiny . . . should be addressed . . . by the
lower courts.”).
Neil Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme
Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 680 (1996) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s ambiguous opinion in Adarand intentionally avoided the constitutional
merits of the affirmative action program, reflecting its preference to defer judgment on
this issue to elected government).
Fisher v. Texas 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
Id. at 2421 (“[F]airness to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires that it
be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under a correct analysis.”).
Id. at 2422.
To be sure, many interpret the Fisher decision as establishing a more stringent strict scrutiny analysis than what existed previously and setting the stage for a multitude of challenges to affirmative action programs across the country. See Adam Liptak, Judges Step Up
Scrutiny of Race in College Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1; see also Scott Warner et al.,
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: What it Tells Us
(and Doesn’t Tell Us) About the Consideration of Race in College and University Admissions and
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Following Fisher, the Obama administration issued guidance characterizing the Court’s decision as an affirmative approval of the com14
pelling interest of achieving racial diversity among students. The
administration explicitly sanctioned the continued use of raceconscious admissions programs and instructed school officials to rely
on guidance flowing from the Department of Education and Department of Justice, rather than the Court’s opinion, to determine
15
the permissibility of their admissions criteria.
Fisher is paradigmatic of the general forces shaping affirmative action in government procurement of contracts. The need for and implementation of affirmative action in government contracts is largely
left to legislative and agency determination. Courts do not have a
loud voice in shaping the government’s affirmative action practice,
and when they do speak, their words tend to be feeble. With opinions that are ambiguous at best, other government actors are, and
ought to be, left to determine the need for and permissive scope of
affirmative action.
This Comment will argue that the Court’s role in determining the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs is limited. Specifically, the need for and permissive scope of government affirmative action programs ought to be left to legislative and executive branch determinations. Further, this Comment will argue that when a court
does declare a congressionally authorized affirmative action program
unconstitutional, the other branches are justified to interpret any
ambiguity in the Court’s decision narrowly.
Part I will examine the development of affirmative action doctrine
outside of the courts. Even when the Court expresses a strict standard to judge affirmative action programs, it leaves the standard largely underenforced. The Court’s underenforcement translates into

14

15

Other Contexts, THE FED. LAWYER, Aug. 2013, at 48 (arguing that the unresolved questions
of Fisher could lend itself to heightened legal challenges and judicial review of affirmative
action programs).
See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Coll. or Univ. Presidents
on Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Sept. 27, 2013), available at https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201309.pdf. The Department of Education and
Department of Justice issued the guidance in the form of a letter to college and university
presidents. Id. In the letter, the agencies expressed their continued commitment to racial diversity among college and university students. Id.
See Questions and Answers About Fisher v Univ. of Tex. at Austin, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
dcl-qa-201309.html. The Department of Education and Department of Justice affirmatively stated that the Court’s decision does not prohibit schools from taking steps to
achieve a diverse student body, invalidate the use of race, change the strict scrutiny standard, or affect current race-conscious admissions practices at schools. Id.
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recognition that the other branches are better positioned to make interpretive judgments on the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs. When the Court does exercise its interpretive power, the
Executive regularly and justifiably exercises its interpretive independence from the judgment outside the facts of the decided case.
Part II will take a closer look at the history surrounding Adarand
and the limited implications of the Court’s opinion, particularly on
the continued role of race-conscious procurement of government
contracts. Part III will apply Part II’s analysis to a recent case,
16
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense, where the constitution17
ality of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act was at issue. Section
8(a) permits the federal government to reserve the issuance of certain contracts to socially and economically disadvantaged businesses.
Prevailing on its as-applied challenge only, the District Court for the
District of Columbia maintained that Section 8(a) facially survived
strict scrutiny. However, the effects of the DynaLantic decision have
been limited. Rather than examine the constitutionality of Section
8(a) in other contexts, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) has thus
far declined to give the decision any broader application than the
specific scope of DynaLantic.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS
A. Judicial Underenforcement of Affirmative Action
Lawrence Sager points out that there are instances of marked disparity between the Constitution and constitutional law as developed
18
by the courts, producing what he calls a thin constitution. The socalled thin constitution is particularly salient in “redressing the entrenched consequences of institutional racism that was once support19
ed by law.” Sager contends that there are limited circumstances,
such as reparation of past racial injustice, where the Court should
engage in selective underenforcement; that is, it should “stay its hand

16

17
18

19

DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic IV), 885 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D.D.C.
2012) (upholding Section 8(a) as facially constitutional, but finding its application to
mobile flight simulator contracts unconstitutional).
15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2012).
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 410 (1993) (“[T]he range of those matters that are plausible candidates for judicial engagement and enforcement in the name of the Constitution is considerably smaller than the range of those matters that are plausibly understood to implicate the serious questions of political justice.”).
Id. at 411.
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and leave the enforcement” of such rights to the executive and legis20
lative branches.
Under Sager’s selective underenforcement view, the question of
whether federal affirmative action programs are constitutionally viable is an “immensely complex question[] of social strategy and social
responsibility . . . far better addressed by the legislative and executive
branches of government, [a] question[] that seem[s] virtually out of
21
the reach of the judiciary absent special circumstances.” Cornelia
T.L. Pillard reinforces the view that the Court’s tendency to selectively underenforce certain constitutional guarantees leaves the other
branches in a position to ambitiously engage in racial reparation ef22
forts like affirmative action.
B. Explicit and Ambiguous Deference to the Political Branches
Prior to Adarand, the Court was explicit in its deferential stance to
the political branches when it came to affirmative action determinations. Writing the year before Adarand, Christopher L. Eisgruber offered affirmative action as a paradigmatic example of an instance
23
where the Court restrains from embracing judicial supremacy. In
24
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the Court rested its approval of the
federal affirmative action program on the “overriding significance . . . that the [affirmative action programs] have been specifical25
ly approved—indeed, mandated—by Congress.” The Court bound
its decision in deference to Congress’s “power [as a co-equal branch]
to provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States and to en-

20
21
22

23

24
25

Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103
MICH. L. REV. 676, 695 (2005). Pillard points to the scholarly consensus that in such areas
“the political branches are primarily responsible for fulfilling” the constitutional enforcement role. Id. at 695–96, 696 n.59 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336, 1337) (2d ed. 1988)) (“To say this is not to deny that government has affirmative duties to its citizens arising out of the basic necessities of bodily
survival, but only to deny that all such duties are perfectly enforceable in the courts of
law.” (quoting TRIBE, supra)).
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83
GEO. L.J. 347, 347, 355 (1994) (“One example [of the Court’s occasional recognition of
the interpretive superiority of the other branches on specific issues] is the Court’s willingness to defer to Congress . . . with respect to questions about when affirmative action is
consistent with the Constitution’s equality principle.”).
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding as constitutional a federal program enhancing minority
ownership in broadcasting).
Id. at 563.
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force, by appropriate legislation, the equal protection guarantees of
26
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
True, the Court signaled a shift away from explicit deference in
27
Adarand. Rather than extend deference to congressional determinations as it had previously done when evaluating federal affirmative
action programs, the Court purported to subject all racial classifica28
tions to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Merely declaring a new standard, however, the Court declined to apply the standard, content to
continue to leave “unresolved questions remain[ing] concerning the
29
details” of its decision and “whether [the federal affirmative action
30
program] can survive strict scrutiny” to the lower courts. But lower
courts do not retain sole proprietorship on the claim to settle the
Court’s ambiguity. Rather, unresolved questions of the constitutionality of federal affirmative action coupled with the Court’s ambiguity
leave affirmative action decisions “so indeterminate that they essen31
tially are nonbinding” on political actors. Thus, the Court’s insistence on ambiguity and avoidance of the constitutionality of federal
affirmative action programs has translated into indirect deference to
32
the political branches.

26

27

28

29
30
31
32

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court articulated its deferential stance in terms of Congress’s “institutional competence as the National Legislature.” Id.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (stating that the Court
should view all racial classifications with skepticism). Indeed, only the dissenting Justices
mention the Court’s prior explicit deference to Congress in affirmative action decisions.
See id. at 249–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recalling that deference to congressional judgments regarding affirmative actions has been a hallmark of all prior affirmative action decisions and stating that “[f]ederal affirmative-action programs represent the will of our
entire Nation’s elected representatives”); id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this
area, large deference is owed by the Judiciary to Congress’ institutional competence and
constitutional authority to overcome historic racial subjugation.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Id. at 227 (majority opinion) (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–39.
Devins, supra note 9, at 679.
Of course, courts do not always take a deferential stance toward affirmative action determinations. For an example of the court striking down an agency’s affirmative action
practice see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and
the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 875–80 (2010) (discussing the D.C.
Circuit’s determination that the FCC’s race-conscious hiring practices were unconstitutional).
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C. Executive Independence of Judicial Determinations
Following the Adarand decision, Devins found that the Court’s
ambiguity translated to malleability, leaving the other branches with a
33
large degree of autonomy to interpret the decision as they wished.
Furthermore, the Court’s approach to affirmative action was largely
fact-specific rather than far-reaching, giving the other branches significant leeway to interpret the Court’s decision narrowly or broadly
34
according to their policies.
To be sure, there are limits to the Executive’s interpretive independence. It is widely accepted that an executive actor cannot refuse
35
to comply with direct judicial orders. Further, whatever degree of
interpretive independence an executive actor may possess in a given
situation, most scholars agree that executive actors have the freedom
to interpret the Constitution differently than the courts, but should
36
rarely, if ever, directly defy the court’s rulings. However, the executive branch’s practice when interpreting the court’s affirmative action
amounts to neither complete deference nor defiance.
Instead, executive actors exert their interpretive independence in
the gaps of the Court’s affirmative action doctrine—in the feebleness of
its doctrine. Sophia Z. Lee found that a pattern of “creatively narrowing” judicial doctrine can occur when courts decline to issue clear,
37
judicially defined rules. Though the Court may persist in declaring
its strict scrutiny standard when evaluating affirmative action programs, if it also declines to apply the standard, as in Fisher and
Adarand, the contours of strict scrutiny remain largely ambiguous—
free to be narrowed by the Executive.

33
34
35

36
37

Devins, supra note 9, at 719 (emphasizing that the Court’s decision did not give guidance
to Congress or the White House).
Id. at 679 (noting that the meaning of narrow judicial holdings is typically defined by social and political forces).
Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 112 (2004) (discussing that few
scholars, whether “self-described departmentalists” or “judicial supremacists,” would go so
far to say that the President is neither authorized to refuse to comply with judicial decisions nor bound to always defer to the Supreme Court with which he disagrees).
Id.
Lee, supra note 32, at 844, 857. Furthermore, agencies may creatively interpret by “narrowly reading court precedents . . . to reach entirely different constitutional conclusions.”
Id. at 852.
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II. THE FEEBLENESS OF ADARAND IN AFFECTING AGENCY HIRING
PRACTICES
A. Leading to Adarand
The first time the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of a congressionally approved, federal set-aside program was in
38
Fullilove v. Klutznick. In 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works
Employment Act (“the Act”), including a “minority business enterprise” provision that required “at least 10 per centum of the amount
of each [public works] grant shall be expended for minority business
39
enterprises.” To qualify as a minority business enterprise, half of the
business must be owned by minority group members: “Negroes,
40
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”
The Fullilove plurality, applying “a most searching examination” to
Congress’s set-aside program, rejected every constitutional challenge
to the Act and concluded that the best resolution to the affirmative
41
action question was deference. The plurality specifically found that
with respect to affirmative action programs, Congress had the “necessary latitude” to implement federal affirmative action programs to ac42
Following Fullilove, Congress procomplish remedial objectives.
ceeded with confidence to further implement minority set-aside proprograms, “frequently fail[ing] even to pay lip service to Fullilove’s
‘most searching examination’ standard, perceiving that these set43
asides were immunized from constitutional attack.” Indeed, just two
years after the Fullilove decision, Congress enacted the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (“STURAA”) at is44
sue in Adarand.
Though the Fullilove decision was limited to federal programs,
state and local officials also read the decision to green-light their own
45
affirmative action programs. Indeed, by the time the Court recon-

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45

448 U.S. 448 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1980).
Id.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490, 491 (noting that Congress, “after due consideration,” perceived
the need for the affirmative action program).
Id.
Devins, supra note 9, at 703 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491).
Id. Devins notes that throughout the debate surrounding the adoption of the provision, a
single Congressman made a single statement referring to the Court’s decision in Fullilove.
Id.
Devins, supra note 9, at 703 (discussing the effects of Fullilove on state and local governments’ minority set-aside programs).
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sidered affirmative action in Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 46 states and localities had copycatted Congress’s affirmative action plan, with over 234
47
various minority set-aside programs across the country.
In Croson, the Court eliminated any doubts about whether its deferential stance toward congressional affirmative action determinations translated into deference to state and local determinations.
The decision signaled that the “appropriate deference to . . . Congress,
48
a co-equal branch,” did not mirror the deference the Court would
grant to similarly crafted affirmative action programs produced by
49
state and local lawmakers. Striking down the local set-aside program, the Court reinforced the deference it extends to Congress to
find “that past discrimination would cause federal funds to be distributed in a manner which reinforced prior patterns of discrimination,” thereby necessitating the need for federal affirmative action
50
programs. Applying strict scrutiny to the local set-aside program,
however, the Court found that the city failed to meet its evidentiary
burden showing the affirmative action program was necessary to
51
achieve a compelling government interest. Thus, after Fullilove and
Croson, a federal affirmative action program was upheld under a deferential standard while a local affirmative action program was struck
down under strict scrutiny.
Metro Broadcasting further solidified the notion that Congress deserves greater deference when it, “as the National Legislature,” crafts
52
Furthermore, the decision also
an affirmative action program.
pointed to the proposition that when a federal agency develops an affirmative action program under the authority of Congress, it should
be afforded significant deference. At issue in Metro Broadcasting were
two affirmative action programs adopted by the Federal Communica46
47

48
49
50

51
52

488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (striking down a local affirmative action set-aside program under strict scrutiny).
Devins, supra note 9, at 703. Devins discusses the widespread belief within Congress as
well as state and local governments that Fullilove was properly understood as approving affirmative action. Id.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (discussing that the city must make findings outside of those
made by Congress to justify the local set-aside program).
Id. The Court found that Congress could make national findings of discrimination and
take remedial action, such as affirmative action, through the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. On the other hand, the Equal Protection Clause inhibits state
and local lawmakers from importing Congress’s national findings to support their local
set-asides. Id.
Id. at 505 (“We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race.”).
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990) (“[D]eference was appropriate in
light of Congress’ institutional competence as the National Legislature . . . .”).
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tions Commission (“FCC”). 53 While the FCC had crafted the disputed
programs, rather than Congress, the agency grounded its authority to
54
create such programs in federal legislation.
The Communications Act of 1934 repeatedly affirmed the FCC’s
exclusive authority to establish radio and television broadcast stations
based on broad notions of “public convenience, interest, or necessi55
ty.” Under its broad mandate, the agency took notice of the significant disparity that existed between the amount of minorities in the
general population and the amount of minorities that owned radio or
56
Concluding that such a disparity
television broadcast networks.
57
harmed the general public, the FCC developed two policies aimed
at encouraging and facilitating minority ownership of broadcast stations: (1) that minorities applying to own a broadcast station would
58
receive a “plus” to their application, and (2) that minorities would
have the exclusive opportunity to receive reassigned and transferred
59
licenses through an alternative practice called a “distress sale.”
Though the policies were shaped by the FCC, Congress “expressed
emphatic support” for the FCC’s policies and ultimately codified an
appropriations act that required the agency to maintain these poli60
cies.
53
54
55

56
57

58

59

60

Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552.
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1982) (“The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity
will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided
for by this chapter.”).
Metro Broad, 497 U.S. at 553–54 (discussing the underrepresentation of minorities in
broadcast ownership).
Id. (“Unless minorities are encouraged to enter the mainstream of the commercial
broadcasting business, a substantial portion of our citizenry will remain undeserved and
the larger, non-minority audience will be deprived of the views of minorities.” (quoting
FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on Minority Ownership in Broadcasting 1
(1978)).
Id. at 557 (“[T]he FCC announced that minority ownership and participation in management would be considered . . . a ‘plus’ to be weighed together with all other relevant
factors.”); see also In re Applications of WPIX, 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411 (1978) (“[M]inority
ownership and participation is also an affirmative factor enhancing the applicant’s proposal and raising its level in the comparative evaluation . . . .”).
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 557. Typically, when “a licensee whose qualifications to hold a
broadcast license come into question may not assign or transfer that license until the FCC
has resolved its doubts in a noncomparative hearing.” Id. A licensee could, however,
avoid the hearing if it sold “their station to a minority-owned or controlled entity, at a
price ‘substantially’ below its fair market value.” In re Comm’n Policy Regarding Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broad., 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982).
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 572–79 (discussing both Congress’s appropriations Acts requiring the FCC to maintain its affirmative action policies and “the long history of congressional support for those policies prior to the passage of the appropriations Acts . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In relevant part, an appropriations Act provided
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Beginning its analysis of the agency’s affirmative action program,
the Court assuaged any doubts about its validity, emphasizing the
“overriding significance in these cases that the FCC’s minority ownership programs [had] been specifically approved—indeed, mandat61
ed—by Congress.” The Court found no inconsistency with Croson,
emphasizing that the difference between the cases was the difference
62
between Congress and state or local lawmakers. Thus, the Court
expressly indicated that it was separating two lines of jurisprudence
regarding affirmative action programs: one for programs approved
by Congress and another for programs approved by state and local
63
lawmakers.
B. The Decision: Replacing Perceived Inconsistency with Ambiguity
Adarand is most noted for establishing strict scrutiny as the standard to test all affirmative action programs. Rather than adhere to the
bifurcation that had developed in the Court’s prior decisions, the
Court instead declared Metro Broadcasting an outlier that undermined
the Court’s affirmative action doctrine up to that point and deserved
64
to be overruled. The Court distanced itself from the position that
Metro Broadcasting was fully consistent with the decisions in Fullilove
and Croson, instead characterizing the case as a departure “from the
65
fabric of the law.” In other words, the Court found inconsistency
where none had existed before.

61
62
63

64

65

“[t]hat none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively
apply changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Communications Commission . . . to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting licenses, including those established in Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcast Facilities . . . .” Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329–31 (1987).
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 565 (noting that Croson is distinguishable on the basis that “the question of congressional action was not before the Court”).
Id. (indicating that Croson and Fullilove are consistent because Fullilove considered a congressionally approved affirmative action program, whereas Croson did not). The Court
found that Croson expressly “reaffirmed the lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than such classifications prescribed by state and local governments.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The Court outlined three
propositions of all racial classifications that lead to the conclusion that Metro Broadcasting
should be overruled: (1) skepticism of all racial classifications, (2) consistency of treatment of people irrespective of race, and (3) congruence between standards governing
federal and state racial classifications. Id. at 223–27. The Court found that Metro Broadcasting “squarely rejected” congruence, while undermining the other two propositions.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 233–34.
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Though Adarand appeared to do much in terms of altering the
landscape of federal affirmative action doctrine, it did little regarding
the actual program at issue. Adarand centered on the constitutionality of a Department of Transportation minority set-aside program,
STURAA, which provided that “not less than 10 percent” of the appropriated funds “shall be expended with small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged in66
dividuals.” The STURAA’s definition of “socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals” adopted the Small Business Act’s race67
based presumptions. Instead of deciding the question of whether
the STURAA program was constitutionally permissible, the Court
merely declared strict scrutiny the proper standard to judge all affirmative action programs, refusing to touch the lingering question of
the program’s constitutionality—thus, leaving the actual implications
of the standard to be “addressed in the first instance by the lower
68
courts.”
C. The Feebleness of Adarand
Given that Adarand simultaneously heightened judicial scrutiny of
congressionally approved affirmative action programs while declining
to decide whether the STURAA program passed muster, the deci69
sion’s “mixed message makes it a rather slippery precedent.” Following Adarand, Devins predicted that the Court’s refusal to apply its
own standard would render the decision “a limited and disingenuous
70
precedent.” The lingering ambiguity surrounding what effect strict
scrutiny might actually have on federal affirmative action programs
71
cabined the Court’s role in affirmative action determinations. Instead of being defined by lower courts as Adarand purportedly designed, Devins contended that the decision is better understood as
72
“the culmination of two decades of issue avoidance,” and that “the
Court’s refusal to provide any guidance about the application of strict
66
67

68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 145).
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 § 106(c)(2)(B).
The Small Business Act provides a presumption that “[s]ocially disadvantaged individuals
are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because
of their identity as a member of a group . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1987).
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238–39.
Devins, supra note 9, at 677.
Id. at 701.
Id. (“[Adarand] further reveals the Court’s limited role in defining the affirmative action
debate.”).
Id. at 700.

May 2015]

FEEBLE IN FACT

1475

review gives Congress, the White House, and lower courts a free hand
73
to apply Adarand as they see fit.”
Within a month of Adarand, through an Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) opinion, the Department of Justice issued guidance to the
executive branch’s interpretation and implementation of the deci74
sion. The memo acknowledged both the strict scrutiny standard
that would now apply to all federal affirmative action programs and
the gaping holes in the Court’s decision concerning the application
75
of that standard. The OLC emphasized that the Court did not declare the STURAA program, or any other federal affirmative action
76
program, unconstitutional. The memo further declared the possibility, even likelihood, that Congress’s affirmative action programs
were “entitled to greater deference than programs adopted by state
77
and local governments.” Overall, the OLC memo did not provide
any clearer picture of whether federal affirmative action programs
are constitutionally permissible under the Court’s new standard, but
stopped far short of casting doubt on any program whatsoever; rather, the memo concluded decisively that “[n]o affirmative action
78
program should be suspended prior to such an evaluation.”
The following year, the Department of Justice issued another
memorandum to guide agencies in their procurement practices to
79
ensure compliance with Adarand. Introducing the memo with a nod
to the Court’s extension of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action
programs, the memo proceeded to emphasize the “credible and constitutionally defensible” judgment of Congress “that race-conscious
federal procurement programs are needed to remedy the effects” of

73
74

75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 701.
Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 19 Op. O.L.C. 171 (1995) [hereinafter Adarand Memo] (issuing
preliminary legal guidance on the implications of Adarand and the new standard for assessing the constitutionality of federal affirmative action programs). The OLC issues legal advice to the executive branch regarding constitutional judgments and is charged
with resolving interagency disputes about a particular point of law. Pillard, supra note 22,
at 710–12. The OLC issues opinions or advice when the executive seeks it, but the executive is under no obligation to request advice from the OLC, nor is it obligated to follow
the advice once it is given. Id. at 710–12, 714.
Adarand Memo, supra note 74, at 172 (“The Court did not discuss in detail the . . . requirements of strict scrutiny . . . .”).
Id.
Id. at 171 (pointing out that the Court articulated a deferential disposition towards Congress in past affirmative action rulings).
Id. at 202–03.
Prop. Reforms to Affirmative Action in Fed. Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26042 (May 23,
1996) [hereinafter Proposed Reforms].
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past discrimination that have produced barriers to minority pro80
curement contracts.
The memo further recognized the important role that agencies
play in framing constitutionally permissible affirmative action pro81
grams. While Congress determines the need for federal affirmative
action programs, it delegates the “determination of how to achieve
82
the remedial goals” it has established to the agencies.
The memo pays particular attention to the Section 8(a) Program
83
of the Small Business Act (“Section 8(a)” or “Program”). Section
8(a) permits agencies to reserve certain procurement contracts to so84
cially and economically disadvantaged businesses. The Program establishes race-based presumptions that categorize members of certain
85
racial and ethnic minority groups as “socially disadvantaged.” The
Department of Justice concluded that Section 8(a) is constitutional
and that race may be relied upon as the agency determines, while also urging agencies to “use race-neutral alternatives to the maximum
86
extent possible.”

80
81

82
83
84

85

86

Id.
Id. Though Congress established goals for the participation of Small Disadvantaged
Businesses in agency procurement, it largely delegated the authority to pursue those
goals to agencies. See id. (explaining that the Court left the remedial goals of affirmative
action progams to agencies to determine); see also 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2012) (establishing goals for agencies and delegating authority to agencies to achieve those goals).
Proposed Reforms, supra note 79, at 26042.
Section 8(a) is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1996).
See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B) (1996) (“It shall be the duty of the Administration and it is
hereby empowered, whenever it determines such action is necessary or appropriate . . . to
arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts . . . to socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns . . . .”).
See id. § 637(a)(5) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a
group without regard to their individual qualities.”). Congress found that the presumption extended generally to all minority groups including, but not limited to, “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Indian Tribes, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Hawaiian Organizations, and other minorities.” Id. § 631(f)(1)(C). However, there
are no presumptions automatically qualifying individuals as economically disadvantaged.
See Id. § 637(a)(6)(A) (stating that the government shall consider economic measures as
part of its determination of social disadvantaged individuals).
Proposed Reforms, supra note 79, at 26049. To determine whether Section 8(a) satisfied
the “narrowly tailored” requirement of Adarand, the DOJ considered six factors: (1)
whether race-neutral alternatives were first considered and determined to be insufficient
solutions; (2) the scope of the program and whether it is flexible; (3) whether race is the
sole factor in eligibility or one factor among others; (4) whether any numerical target is
reasonably related to the number of qualified minorities in the applicant pool; (5)
whether the duration of the program is limited and subject to periodic review; and (6)
the extent of the burden imposed on nonbeneficiaries of the program. Id. at 26042.
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Following Adarand, the executive branch undoubtedly recognized
strict scrutiny as the new standard, but exercised interpretive independence within the many gaps of the decision. Rather than find any
federal affirmative action program unconstitutional, or even questionable, the Executive proceeded on the assumption that affirmative
action determinations would continue to be shaped by Congress and
the agencies, not the courts. Unsurprisingly, a decade after Adarand,
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found agency procurement
87
practices largely unaffected by the decision. The Commission focused on the Department of Justice’s command to maximize raceneutral alternatives to comport with Adarand, concluding that agencies by-and-large disregard such alternatives and persist in race88
conscious procurement. The report found that one of the primary
mechanisms agencies use to justify race-conscious programs is reli89
ance on Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. Rather than search
the Court’s affirmative action doctrine for guidance on whether an
affirmative action program is permissible, the report found that
agencies instead look to Congress and the executive branch to find
90
justification for their programs. Thus, a decade after penning his
prediction, Devins’s assessment proves prescient: “[w]hen it comes to
affirmative action . . . the Court has failed to speak in a way that alters
91
the political forces.”
III. FEEBLENESS CONTINUED: THE RESILIENCE OF SECTION 8(A) IN
DYNALANTIC
Though in 2005 the Commission on Civil Rights all but declared
Section 8(a) at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand,
the Program has proven resilient to constitutional challenge. In
87
88

89

90
91

U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, Federal Procurement After Adarand (2005) [hereinafter
USCCR Report].
Id. at 76. The report analyzed the procurement practices of six agencies: the Department of Defense, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department
of Education, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department
of Transportation. Id. The report concluded that while agencies do engage in some
race-neutral strategies, “no agency reviewed in this report engages in serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives.” Id.
Id. at 70. Chairman Reynolds, who authored the report, expressly pointed to Section 8(a)
as a mechanism agencies use to achieve diversity in contract awards that “does not meet
the Supreme Court’s standard for strict scrutiny.” Report Finds that Agencies Fail to Implement Race-Neutral Alternatives, 2005 EMP. PRAC. 771 (CCH) No. 1430 (Sept. 7, 2005),
available at 2009 WL 4372983.
USCCR Report, supra note 87, at 67 (“Instead, agencies rely upon congressional analysis,
legislation, and regulation to justify the existence of race-conscious programs.”).
Devins, supra note 9, at 720.
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2012, the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(a), but declared the application of the Program to military simulator and training contracts unconstitutional in
92
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense (DynaLantic IV). In its
analysis of the Program, the District Court emphasized the limited
application of Section 8(a), that it should be applied only in contexts
where the government is able to produce evidence of past discrimination—a prerequisite to meeting “its burden to show a compelling in93
terest” in utilizing the program in a specific industry. Following the
decision, the government has complied with the court’s injunction
94
against awarding military simulator contracts under Section 8(a),
but continues to use to Section 8(a) to award government contracts,
95
specifically in the context of military procurement.
A. Procedural History of DynaLantic
In December 1995, the same year that Adarand was decided,
DynaLantic sued the DOD because it was excluded from bidding on a
multimillion dollar contract to provide the Navy with a helicopter
96
flight simulator. Pursuant to an agreement with the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”), the DOD limited competition for the contract to Section 8(a) participants, which did not include DynaLantic,
a small company that had designed and manufactured similar simula97
tors for the military in the past. By virtue of being excluded from
competing on the contract, DynaLantic challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, both facially and asapplied to mobile flight simulator contracts, and sought to enjoin the
98
Because
DOD from using the Program for procurement.
DynaLantic had never applied to participate in the Program, the dis-

92
93
94

95

96
97

98

885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 243 (2012).
Id. at 283.
Memorandum from Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy, on Immediate Cessation of Small Business Development Program (8(a) Program)
to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter DOD Memo].
Partnership Agreement Between The U.S. Small Business Administration and the U.S.
Department of Defense (Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Partnership Agreement]. The partnership agreement is a contract, dated months after DynaLantic, between the DOD and
the SBA to continue awarding procurement contracts through Section 8(a). Id.
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic I), 937 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996).
Id.; see also DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic II), 115 F.3d 1012, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (describing DynaLantic’s history with military contacts and its statutory status
as “small” under the Small Business Act).
DynaLantic I, 937 F. Supp. at 2.
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trict court initially held that the company lacked standing to chal99
lenge the constitutionality of Section 8(a).
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed, finding that DynaLantic
100
However,
did in fact have standing to challenge the Program.
standing was not the only barrier that DynaLantic faced in pursuing
its appeal. Shortly after DynaLantic filed its initial appellate brief, the
101
Rather than finding
Navy canceled the contract at issue.
DynaLantic’s claim moot, the circuit court allowed the company to
“amend its pleadings to raise a general challenge to the 8(a) program
as administered by the SBA and participated in by the Defense De102
partment.”
On remand, the district court narrowly construed DynaLantic’s
constitutional claim as merely challenging the DOD’s usage of Section 8(a), rather than requesting wholesale invalidity of Section
103
8(a). The DOD awards procurement under Section 8(a) pursuant
to statutory goals, outlined in 10 U.S.C. § 2323, also referred to as
104
Section 1207. The court concluded that the record was insufficient
to review the race-based preferences of the statute and Program un105
der strict scrutiny, as required by Adarand. The district court’s decision in this case, as well as the case’s future proceedings, was informed in large part by another affirmative action case being litigated

99

100

101
102

103
104

105

Id. at 3–5. In making its determination, the district dourt relied on the only appellate
precedent on the books at time, originating from the Fifth Circuit, addressing the issue of
standing of a party to challenge the constitutionality of Section 8(a). Id. at 5. In Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, the Fifth Circuit held that a company who “did not even
apply for participation in the program” lacked standing. 477 F.2d 696, 710 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
DynaLantic II, 115 F.3d at 1018. The Circuit Court found that despite DynaLantic’s lack
of desire to participate in Section 8(a), it is nonetheless injured because it simply lacks
the opportunity to compete for a contract the DOD reserves for Section 8(a) contractors.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1014 (“Only a few weeks later, after DynaLantic had filed its initial appellate brief,
the Navy canceled the proposed solicitation for the APT procurement.”).
Id. at 1015. In his dissent, Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit rebutted the
claim that Section 8(a) was a race-based set aside and emphasized the viability of Program
as authorized by Congress. Id. at 1018–19 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., (DynaLantic. III), 503 F. Supp. 2d 262, 266
(D.D.C. 2007).
Id. (“Therefore, plaintiff’s second amended complaint must be read to only raise claims
against the DoD policy in 10 U.S.C. § 2323 and the 8(a) program to the extent employed
by section 2323.”).
Id. at 266–67 (stating that the claim “must be reviewed using strict scrutiny” but ordering
the parties to supplement the record so that the court may “resolve the fundamental issues raised” by the parties).
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at the time against the DOD, Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of
106
Defense, challenging the constitutionality of Section 1207.
B. DynaLantic Follows Rothe’s Lead
The DynaLantic court’s decision to require the parties to further
supplement the record mirrored developments in Rothe decided by
the Federal Circuit two years earlier, requiring the government to develop the record to sufficiently respond to the constitutional chal107
Section 1207 sets the DOD’s contractlenges facing Section 1207.
108
ing goals in terms of “small disadvantaged business” procurement.
Section 1207 is a congressionally approved set-aside program that sets
a goal that 5% of the DOD’s defense contracting would be awarded
to various specified entities, including small businesses owned and
109
operated by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.”
The statute incorporates the same presumption as the Small Business
Act that members of specific minorities groups are socially disadvan110
taged.
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the Rothe district court ruled
111
that Section 1207 satisfied strict scrutiny. Two weeks after the deci106

107

108

109

110
111

See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe I), 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of Section 1207). Around 1998, Rothe Development Corporation lost a bid for procurement with the DOD despite being the lowest bidder. Id. at
941. No one contested the reason Rothe lost the contract to a business owned by a Korean-American, for “Rothe lost the bid for the contract solely as a result of
the . . . preference designed to favor ‘socially and economically disadvantaged persons’”
under Section 1207. Id. (emphasis added). What Rothe did contest, however, was the
constitutionality of Section 1207 as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe V), 413 F.3d 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding that Rothe could maintain its constitutional challenge but requiring the parties
to further develop the record).
See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1026 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that Section 1207 is facially unconstitutional); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2323
(2012) (outlining the Department of Defense’s contract goals “for small disadvantaged
businesses and certain institutions of higher education”).
10 U.S.C § 2323(a)(1)(A). Congress initially enacted Section 1207 in 1986 to set the
“Contract Goals for Minorities” for National Defense Authorization Act. Rothe VII, 545
F.3d at 1028; see Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1207, 100 Stat. 3816, 3973 (1986). Though the
statute has always contained an expiration date, Congress reenacted the set-aside in 1989,
1992, 1999, 2002, and 2006. Rothe VII, 545 F.3d at 1027–28. At the time Rothe was decided, the statute was set to expire in 2009. Id. at 1028; see also 10 U.S.C § 2323(k)(1) (“This
section applies in the Department of Defense to each of the fiscal years 1987 through
2009.”).
See USCCR Report, supra note 87.
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VI), 499 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (W.D. Tex.
2007) (“The Court finds that the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program satisfies the
requirements of strict scrutiny.”). On remand, the government presented six disparity
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sion, the DynaLantic court followed Rothe’s lead, indicating that the
decision made “clear that most of [the] evidence [was] not currently
112
before the Court.” In order to properly evaluate the constitutionality of Section 8(a) under strict scrutiny, the court needed—like the
Federal Circuit in Rothe—“the evidence that Congress considered . . . to ensure that it had a strong basis in evidence for its conclu113
sion that remedial action was necessary.”
The DynaLantic court signaled approval of Rothe’s determination
that Section 1207 is a constitutionally permissible set-aside pro114
However, while the parties in DynaLantic were supplementgram.
ing their records, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court in
115
Unlike the district
Rothe, finding Section 1207 unconstitutional.
court, the Federal Circuit found that the race-based preference found
116
in Section 1207 failed strict scrutiny. Though the government had
complied with the circuit court’s prior request to supplement the
record to establish Congress’s strong basis in evidence of a compelling interest, the circuit was unconvinced, finding the government’s
evidence representative of only a “few isolated instances of discrimi117
nation” that were “insufficient to uphold the nationwide program.”
Striking down Section 1207 infused uncertainty into the continu118
ing viability of race-based preferences in government contracting.
As the DynaLantic court reconsidered the constitutionality of Section
8(a), it now had to measure the implications of the fresh unconstitutional status of Section 1207.

112
113
114
115

116
117
118

studies from various states that were before Congress as it considered reauthorizing Section 1207 in 2006. Id. at 835–36.
DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic III), 503 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (D.D.C
2007).
Id. at 265 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. (accepting the holding in Rothe).
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“[W]e hold that Section 1207, on its face . . . violates the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment right to due process.”).
Id. (“And because Congress did not have a ‘strong basis in evidence’ . . . the statute fails
strict scrutiny.”).
Id. at 1045.
See Subash S. Iyer, Resolving Constitutional Uncertainty in Affirmative Action Through Constrained Constitutional Experimentation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1060, 1070 (2012) (noting that
Rothe is inconsistent with other affirmative action decisions); see also Trent Taylor, The End
of an Era? How Affirmative Action in Government Contracting Can Survive After Rothe, 39 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 853, 866–67 (discussing the possibility that Rothe “demonstrates that affirmative
action in contracting is longer needed or otherwise relevant to government procurement
policy”).
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C. DynaLantic Reconsidered
Five years after the record was reopened, and four years after Section 1207 was found unconstitutional by the Federal Circuit, the District Court for the District of Columbia returned to DynaLantic and
Section 8(a) to determine whether the federal affirmative action pro119
Rather than finding the case
gram passed constitutional muster.
moot due to the fate of Section 1207, the court determined that the
case remained a live controversy “because DoD continues to participate in [the Section 8(a)] program under the statutory authority of
120
the Small Business Act, independent of [Section 1207].”
Examining whether Congress met its burden of presenting a
strong basis in evidence to support its compelling interest, the court
121
briefly touched on the level of deference it would afford Congress.
Citing Rothe, the court stated that “although Congress is entitled to no
deference in its ultimate conclusion that race-conscious action is warranted, its fact-finding process is generally entitled to a presumption
122
of regularity and deferential review.”
Despite what may first appear to be a threatening stance toward
Section 8(a), the court’s “no deference” policy only adversely affected
the Program where Congress was completely silent. The district court
readily found that the evidence before Congress when enacting Section 8(a) was sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest in
“breaking down barriers to minority business development created by
discrimination and its lingering effects, including exclusion from
123
contracting with the federal government.” The court differed from

119
120
121
122

123

See DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic IV), 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D.D.C.
2012).
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Id. at 251.
Id. (emphasis added); see Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe III), 262 F.3d 1306,
1321 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“That Congress is entitled to no deference in its ultimate
conclusion that race-based relief is necessary does not mean that Congress is entitled to
no deference in its factfinding.”). The Rothe court apparently grounded its assertion in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), discussed in Part II, supra, when the Court
stated that “[t]he factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
However, the affirmative action program in Croson did not originate from Congress, and
the level of deference owed to Congress was not at issue in that case. See supra Part II.
DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (citing Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 27, 29). The court
relied on a variety of evidence in finding a compelling interest including legislative history of the Section 8(a) Program, post-enactment evidence of discrimination, and state and
local disparity studies.
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the Rothe court by examining post-enactment evidence 124 to assess
both the “inception” and the “continuing compelling need” for Sec125
tion 8(a) and relying on state and local disparity studies to find a
compelling interest. Though purporting to limit the deference it afforded Congress, the court relied heavily on Congress’s factfinding to
126
ultimately uphold Section 8(a) against the facial challenge.
Though rejecting the facial challenge to Section 8(a), the court
was unable to afford such deference to DOD’s application of Section
127
8(a) to military simulation and training procurements. The difference in the court’s conclusions between the two challenges lies not in
128
the sufficiency of evidence, but in the mere existence of evidence.
The court emphasizes that it is undisputed between the parties that
no evidence was offered of past discrimination specific to the simulator and training industry—no reports, hearings, discussions, anecdotes, or citation to a single instance of “past or present discrimina129
Though the court
tion in the simulation and training industry.”
does not specify how much evidence is sufficient to justify applying
Section 8(a) to a particular industry, it is clear that zero evidence is
not enough. Finding Section 8(a) unconstitutionally applied, the
court hinted at its willingness to uphold other applications, as long as
130
Thus, poised to take a deferential
some evidence was present.
124

125

126
127
128
129
130

There is a split among circuits on the proper role of post-enactment evidence in determining whether an affirmative action program satisfies strict scrutiny, with many circuits
utilizing post-enactment evidence in their analyses. Compare Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VI), 499 F. Supp. 2d 775, 1327–28 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that it
was impermissible for the district court to rely on post-enactment evidence to find a compelling interest in reauthorizing Section 1207, but that it would be permissible to rely on
post-enactment evidence when making an as-applied determination), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1166–68 (10th Cir. 2000) (examining postenactment evidence when determining whether a compelling interest existed), and Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1003 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on
post-enactment evidence to find a compelling interest).
The court notes that “hundreds of disparity studies” had been placed before Congress.
DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 265. Though the Rothe court found the disparity studies
presented to it insufficient, the DynaLantic court gave them some weight, even though the
government had “not relied heavily on those studies.” Id.; see Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the disparity
studies were “insufficient to form the statistical core of the ‘strong basis in evidence’ required to uphold the statute”).
DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (“For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes
that the Section 8(a) program, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1), is constitutional on its face.”).
Id. at 283 (holding that DynaLantic prevailed on its as-applied challenge).
Id. at 280 (“Defendants concede that they do not have evidence of discrimination in this
industry.”).
Id.
Id. at 283 (“Without question, there is a compelling government interest in combating []
discrimination where it exists.” (alteration in original)) (quoting Cortez III Serv. Corp. v.
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stance to Congress and the DOD’s determination that affirmative action was constitutionally permissible, the court found nothing that it
could defer to.
D. The Feebleness of DynaLantic
Following DynaLantic, the DOD exercised its interpretive independence to narrow the effects of the holding to the specific facts of
131
Following the opinion, Richard Ginman, Director of
the case.
DOD’s Procurement and Acquisition Policy, issued a statement that
suspended the use of Section 8(a) to all future “contracts for procurement of military simulators or any services in the military simula132
The memo specifically refused to give any guidance
tor industry.”
133
Rather than
on Section 8(a) awards awarded in other industries.
advising the agency on the scope or application of the court’s holding, Ginman was silent on the issue, leaving all Section 8(a) pro134
A
curement outside the narrow context of simulators untouched.
few months after DynaLantic, the DOD renewed its longstanding
commitment to the SBA to continue awarding procurement through
135
Section 8(a).
CONCLUSION
The D.C. District Court’s recent decision in DynaLantic illustrates
the continuing force congressional authorization of affirmative action
bears on the judiciary’s analysis of these programs, while highlighting
the deference that courts continue to afford the legislature and the
degree of independence the executive retains in interpreting judicial
decisions. Though the district court found the DOD’s specific application of Section 8(a) to mobile flight simulators unconstitutional,
the agency has not suspended any Section 8(a) procurement except
for those directly enjoined by the district court.
Adarand purported to replace deference to congressionally approved and agency implemented federal affirmative action programs

131
132
133
134
135

Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 950 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 1996)). The court also
signals the possibility of applying Section 8(a) to the simulator and training procurement
if it was able to articulate “a strong basis in evidence for doing so.” Id. at 293.
See DOD Memo, supra note 94; see also District Court Decision Sparks DOD Contracting
Change, 54 NO. 33 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 277 (2012).
See DOD Memo, supra note 94.
Id. (“[I]t is not possible to give general guidance that would apply to all situations . . . .”).
Id.
See Partnership Agreement, supra note 95.
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with strict scrutiny. Though strict in theory, these programs continue
to be largely determined and crafted by the federal government’s political actors, not the judiciary. When the judiciary attempts to analyze an affirmative action program, its decisions tend to be ambiguous, leaving significant uncertainty surrounding the application of
strict scrutiny. Over time, the sustained ambiguity in the courts’ affirmative action decisions has translated into feebleness—deference
to legislative and agency determinations while giving the Executive
significant leeway to offer independent interpretations of the judicial
doctrine.

